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Abstract 
This article employs a Lacanian framework to re-visit the vexed relationship between 
psychoanalysis and medication, which, it is claimed, also pertains to debates about the status 
of the psychoanalytic body. Whilst acknowledging the importance of critiques of ‘Big Pharma’, 
the article makes the case for a different approach. It argues both that ‘medication’ can be 
considered as a (dominant) discourse that extends well beyond the taking of pills, and relatedly, 
that the psychoanalytic clinic reveals the ways in which subjects can make use of medication 
in often creative and productive ways. It does so partly via a brief clinical vignette and partly 
through a reflection on the issues raised in an article by the French Lacanian psychoanalyst, 
Éric Laurent, which posits four libidinal modes of medication: the pharmakon, the placebo, the 
‘surplus of life’, and anaesthetics. Overall, the article argues that while psychoanalysts must 
not work for ‘Big Pharma’, they can support the uses to which some subjects put the products 
of ‘Big Pharma’. 








A Spoonful of Sugar: Medication and the Psychoanalytic Body 
What is a body?  
Philosophy has asked this question many times in many ways, from the atomism of the 
Epicureans to the mind-body dualism of the Cartesians, and from the extended substance of 
the Spinozans to the techno-utopianism of more recent transhumanists (who hope to bypass 
embodiment altogether by converting consciousness into uploadable data). Over two millennia 
of wrestling with this question suggests the answer may not be so simple.  
Psychoanalysis, too, has been animated by the question of what a body is since its inception. 
This has not been for abstract philosophical reasons, however, but because its mysterious 
efficacy revealed something Freud himself was so astonished by that he regularly linked it to 
magic.1 His early work with hysterical conversion not only showed the ideogenesis of 
symptoms, and thus that the body is directly affected by ideas; but it also demonstrated that, 
under conditions of transference, speech itself can remove the diverse physical ailments that 
marked the presentation of hysteria in his epoch. Despite a thorough grounding in neuro-
anatomy and the positivist medical model of the 19th century, Freud was forced by his 
encounter with the ‘talking cure’ to ask what kind of body this could be, such that it appeared 
so permeable to the power of words. Mesmerism and then hypnotism had already posed this 
issue before him, in fact, as had the debate about ‘pain without lesions’ (Hodgkiss, 2000; 
Goldberg, 2012) which presented such a blind-spot to what Michel Foucault (1963/2003) called 
the ‘medical gaze’ (inclined as that gaze was to see even the living body as a cadaver-in-
waiting). But in a new and decisive way with Freudian psychoanalysis, the living human body, 
despite being more and more defined by sexuality, could no longer be conceived in reductively 
biological terms. It became an organic, but also an inextricably symbolic body, one in which 
these two dimensions were connected by an enigmatic torsion that could be mobilised in the 
analytic setting. If, as Freud argued, psychic representatives could carry quanta of libidinal 
affect via cathexis, it followed that for human beings there must be a recursive relation between 
language and the organism. 
This psychoanalytic twist between soma and psyche was scandalous to a psychiatry that had 
recently been inspired by the discovery of the treponema of syphilis to become more, not less, 
biological (Shorter, 1998). For a time, extrapolating from the cognitive effects of neurosyphilis 
seemed to promise the categorisation of all mental pathologies within a degenerative disease-
model, and ultimately the reduction of the troubled mind to the malfunctioning brain. With his 
Project for a Scientific Psychology, Freud had started out on a related path, yet deviated from 
it to open up a completely new one. Today, as mainstream psychiatry becomes even more 
intensively biological – hunting for the genetic markers of schizophrenia or investing heavily 
in the neuroscience of the ‘addicted brain’ – this ethico-political battle over what a body is 
arguably centres above all on medication.  
Ever since the revolution in neuroleptics in the 1950s, medication has privileged a 
conceptualisation of the body as a complex chemical composite prone to becoming 
‘unbalanced’, but also, crucially, to being ‘re-balanced’ by the introduction of external 
psychoactive compounds.2 The medicated body is thus a kind of plastic biochemical surface 
that responds to the stimuli provided, ultimately, by commodities produced on the market. This 
is not a body that speaks (or if it does, only for the few minutes required to tick DSM diagnostic 
boxes). Still less is it a body entangled in the defiles of the signifier and thus given neither by 
God nor by Nature, but rather by the Other of language and of the social link, as Jacques Lacan 
would have it. However, it is a body that is now more or less everywhere in the same sense that 
capitalism produces customers everywhere. Whereas first-generation anti-psychotics were 
confined to the context of the psychiatric hospital or asylum system, and thus to a rather discrete 
set of institutionalised bodies, the expansiveness of markets soon burst these constraints. In the 
latter half of the 20th century, a thorough-going medicalisation of everyday life both 
‘democratised’ psychiatric disorders to the point of turning them into a kind of human right 
(‘to each their label!’) and established an exponentially larger market of stressed and depressed 
bodies calling out to be regulated by pharmaceutical products. By the 1990s, it was recognised 
that America, land of the right to the pursuit of happiness, had become a ‘Prozac Nation’ 
(Wurtzel, 1994). 
Critique or Clinic? 
None of this really comes as news to most of us, however. The critique of so-called ‘Big 
Pharma’ is now rather well-developed and well-known (see Law, 2006; Goldacre, 2013; 
Marmot, 2016). Various ‘survivor movements’ – sometimes inspired by the anti-psychiatry of 
figures like Cooper (2013), Laing (1990) and Szasz (2010) – have testified to the potential 
horror of encounters with psychiatric services and their at times bruising use of the ‘chemical 
cosh’ (see Saks, 2007; Faulkner, 2017). Yet good psychiatrists and GPs also struggle against 
the problem of over-prescription, especially regarding anti-depressants, but to little avail as 
diagnostic criteria simultaneously become ever more inclusive.3 Even governments with 
(residual) public healthcare systems, as in the UK, have been pushed to question the pricing 
practices of multinational pharmaceutical corporations as they attempt to justify dwindling 
health and welfare budgets. Meanwhile, on a global level, pharmaceutical giants effectively 
profit from the gap between the haves and have-nots, as the controversy surrounding the cost 
of retroviral drugs for AIDS treatment on the African continent shows.4 Few now would deny 
that there is a global market in mental illness, with its own version of what the Occupy 
Movement christened ‘the 1%’ (referring to the concentration of the world’s wealth in hands 
of the very top percentile). 
Quite rightly, psychoanalysts have contributed to this critique of ‘Big Pharma’ (Jacobson, 
2009; Leader, 2009; Samuels, 2017; Verhaeghe, 2008). They have produced polemics against 
the tail-wagging-the-dog problem of diagnoses clustering around medication’s effects rather 
than the other way around; against the superficially behavioural conceptualisation of 
symptomatology; and against the abnegation of psychoanalytic ethics involved in the knee-jerk 
recourse to pills. Whilst drugs and medication have of course been present in the history of 
psychoanalysis – from Freud’s early enthusiasm for cocaine to the central place of 
trimethylamine in his dream of Irma’s injection, and on to his lethal addiction to cigars – the 
fact remains that the only thing ‘administered’ in analysis is speech. It is therefore vitally 
important that psychoanalysts continue to speak up for what later Lacan called the corps 
parlant (Lacan, 1999/2000, p. 131), the speaking body, which in-corporates the subject; but it 
is also important that they question the dominance of the biomedical body which tends instead 
to ‘suture the subject’ (Lacan, 1966/2006a, p. 731), turning it into an object not so very different 
from Pavlov’s famous salivating dogs. Having said all of this, in what follows I want to take a 
different tack.  
Critiques of ‘Big Pharma’ operating at these socio-political levels are extremely important, yet 
they are not necessarily of much use in – and possibly even a hindrance to – clinical practice. 
There, our polemics arguably have no place, since the ability to listen to the speech of our 
analysands continues to depend on the famous “evenly-hovering attention” (Freud 1912, 
p.115–116) that Freud insisted on as a pillar of clinical technique. The consulting room 
obviously cannot be a soapbox. I want to stress this clinical rather than overtly ‘critical’ 
perspective primarily as a matter of pragmatics: like it or not today, many of our analysands 
bring demands for, questions about, and indeed varying practices with, medication. Certainly, 
to refuse to work with anyone taking medication would seriously test the sustainability of most 
private practices! Ironically, such a refusal would also be a negative endorsement of the 
medical model itself, as if medication really did reduce subjects to mere biological entities 
somehow outside of language. As analysts, we should approach this issue from exactly the 
opposite direction: namely, from the point of view of the singular uses to which subjects can 
and do put medication, both within and without the analytic setting.  
To do so, we should probably approach medication not ‘empirically’ per se, but as a signifier 
or a series of signifiers organised into an encompassing discourse, one which does not rely for 
its effects solely on pills themselves. If, for Lacan, a discourse is a form of social bond which 
produces specific modalities of the subject, it follows that this broad-based discourse of 
medication shapes the way in which individuals experience their own bodies today. For 
example, contemporary practices around ‘healthy eating’ (which can mask seriously 
‘disordered’ eating of course) imply a kind of input-output coefficient which owes a lot to the 
biomedical model of the body, as does the ‘statisticalisation’ of everything from sleep to sex 
afforded by the popular ‘Fitbit Tracker’. In such a context, it is not misleading to say that health 
foods, for example, effectively function like medicine (‘they taste so horrible they must be good 
for you!’). Much the same could be said of bodily regimes such as yoga or ‘cardio’ at the gym. 
For those who seek help for their discontents, the discourse of medication also frames 
assumptions about what a ‘therapy’ is, or should be, even before one is underway. The very 
language of mental ‘illness’ calls for a ‘cure’ which, by analogy with a dose of antibiotics or a 
flu-jab, implies a return to a pre-existing state of wellness, one that covertly rests on a trope of 
physiological well-being. For Lacan, this is incompatible with analysis,5 which, not being a 
therapy, must be of the order of a novel production (often of new symptomatic forms of 
suffering in fact, at least initially), rather than a return to any prior functionality. Behind this 
medicalised notion of cure is also a biopolitical ideal of economic productivity (see Foucault, 
2008/2010): bodies are ‘well’ when they are able to return to work. Such utilitarian framings 
of ‘therapy’ are linked not only to employer-based healthcare insurance, but also to public 
healthcare systems which must now undertake cost-benefit analyses to prove their value for 
money to tax payers (Polzer and Power, 2016). When analysands enter analysis hoping to ‘get 
well’, many of these assumptions, and indeed material forces, can be at play.  
In this sense, analysands can be interpellated by the discourse of medication without ever 
popping actual pills at all. If we adopt this wider, discursive understanding of medication it 
becomes obvious that as analysts we cannot not engage with it. The critique of ‘Big Pharma’ 
has its vital place, but the clinic is also a critical praxis where medication is frequently 
implicated in the work. 
A Brief Vignette: ‘Big A.’ 
I was encouraged to broach this topic by two things. Firstly, by a case from my own practice 
which prompted a lot of reflection for me. I will provide a very brief vignette of that shortly. 
Secondly, however, I was also inspired by an excellent article by Éric Laurent which originally 
appeared in French in 2003, but was translated into English in 2016 with the apt title ‘How to 
Swallow the Medication?’ (Laurent, 2016). I would like to use the co-ordinates provided by 
Laurent’s article to think through both my case and the broader implications for working 
analytically with, and not simply against, this pervasive discourse of medication today. 
This case dated from a time when I worked as an addiction therapist in the context of a charity. 
By its very nature, the clinic of addiction often highlights the blurry line separating medication 
from drugs in the illicit sense, and this was just such a case. I will call my analysand ‘A.’. A. 
was a taxi driver in his early 50s. He sought help because of a serious gambling problem, but 
his primary complaint related to a host of bodily phenomena: heart palpitations, profuse 
sweating, what he called a ‘churning stomach’, and awful insomnia. He was constantly 
‘agitated’. He treated his agitated body by smoking great quantities of marijuana which, at the 
other extreme, left him ‘comatosed”’in a way that was enraging his partner. She it was who 
nudged him to get help. Nonetheless, A. said he ‘couldn’t hold it together’ without this 
regulation by marijuana, the ‘it’ in this commonplace phrase clearly referring to his body. His 
‘agitation’ was especially intense when he was working in the small hours of the night in his 
taxi. Often sitting for several hours waiting for a customer, he suffered paranoid thoughts that 
someone was about to ‘attack him with a knife’, specifically in his ‘churning stomach’. He 
would sit there shaking and sweating in a state of exhausting hyper-vigilance. After a while he 
would give up and go home so he could smoke weed again and become ‘comatosed’. The 
gambling, it transpired, was an attempt to make up for the loss of income that resulted from 
this yo-yoing between a state of agitation and of being comatosed. 
In the first few sessions, A. put these bodily difficulties down to the stress caused by his 
gambling, but he also connected it to the death of his father two years earlier. He spoke of a 
better time in his early-to-mid 20s when his father was alive and A. was enthusiastic about 
going to the gym. In fact, back then his friends called him ‘Big A.’ because he worked out so 
much. He went into detail about how different his body had felt then, how, after a session lifting 
weights, he’d been aware of every muscle as he walked down the street, of feeling as though 
he ‘had armour on’. He then recalled a photograph taken by his father during that period. He 
bought it into the next session: it showed A. with his shirt off, flexing his muscles for the 
camera like a body-builder. It was important for him that the photo was taken by his father 
because it showed ‘how my father saw me’. After bringing me this photo, A. spontaneously 
put it on the dashboard of his taxi and started to feel much better. Using this ‘talisman’, as he 
called it, he was able to work through the night without being assailed by those vague paranoid 
fears of being stabbed. His recourse to gambling significantly diminished. He then re-joined 
the gym after many years, trying to find his way back to Big A. This practice with the body 
was also a connection to his son, who was keen on the gym as well. A.’s marijuana usage 
almost disappeared as he started out on this ‘health-kick’.  And yet, in its place came something 
else, something at the aforementioned blurry intersection between medication and drugs: 
namely, steroids. He managed to obtain these, illegally, from a doctor for whom it seemed to 
be a profitable side-line. A. developed a regular ritual with his son whereby they would inject 
each other with the steroids in turn, and then compare the enhanced results at the gym with 
each other. This father-son ritual seemed to both re-inscribe a paternal link that had been broken 
by his own father’s death and literally give A. his body back: he started to wear tight T-shirts 
to sessions and show me his arms so that I could comment on how big Big A. was becoming. 
He seemed to be using the transference to put me in the position of his father’s gaze which had 
once supported his bodily integrity.  
For me, this case of what I diagnosed as a schizophrenia6 raised all sorts of questions. The 
marijuana was clearly a means of regulating an invasive jouissance that A. called ‘agitation’, 
which seemed to localise on his “churning stomach”, but the resulting state of being 
‘comatosed’ was not compatible with either his job or his conjugal life. Setting aside any moral 
or medical qualms one might have about A.’s use of steroids to break this cycle, I found myself 
working with someone for whom they were genuinely crucial in recomposing his body-image. 
Steroids provided a support, in the real, for the imaginary consistency he had lost, functioning 
almost as a ‘supplement’ in both the medical and the Lacanian senses of that word. In short, A. 
confronted me with one of those clinical moments where a choice must be made: either you 
work with a putatively biological body constructed around notions of ‘health’, or you work 
with the body of jouissance which is beyond the pleasure principle. In such moments, it is 
worth remembering Lacan’s sarcastic comment, in Seminar VII, on the kind of ‘good’ 
utilitarianism imposes: ‘What I want is the good of others in the image of my own. That doesn’t 
cost me too much’ (Lacan, 2008a, p. 230). 
 
Four Libidinal Modes of Medication 
Having introduced the case of A., I will turn now to Éric Laurent’s article (2016). His 
overarching message there is that, far from being an obstacle, a subject’s relation to medication 
can be a useful diagnostic indicator in the differential clinic. He highlights the ways in which 
medication can be 1) the target of neurotic demands addressed to the symbolic Other, 2) a ‘real’ 
regulation of jouissance by ‘self-medicating’ psychotic subjects, and even 3) an instrument of 
perverse practices which aim to produce anxiety in the Other (an example of which, though he 
does not mention it, might be the use of date-rape drugs). He therefore enjoins us, as analysts, 
to take medication seriously in our own way, not as a ‘magic chemical bullet’ with direct 
psychokinetic effects – though I would argue that we should not deny that these effects do 
indeed exist – but as a discourse with subjective dimensions.  
Laurent identifies four distinct forms of medication in this expanded sense: the pharmakon, the 
placebo, the surplus of life, and anaesthetics. I will use each of these in turn as platforms for 
some broad reflections and arguments of my own. 
1) The Pharmakon 
For this first form of medication, Laurent draws on a text by the French philosopher Jacques 
Derrida, which offers a ‘deconstructive’ reading of the Platonic dialogue known as the 
Phaedrus (Derrida, 2004). What interested Derrida in the Phaedrus was specifically the 
double-bind it identifies: an apparent solution to the problem of the finite nature of memory – 
writing as a supplementary system of notation – is shown to simultaneously threaten the power 
of recollection as we become more and more dependent on this supposedly ‘external’ 
technology. In other words, the Phaedrus is an ancient precursor to what we could call the 
Google problem of today (why remember anything at all if we can just ‘Google it’?). However, 
what Derrida focusses on in the dialogue is the undecidability of the word pharmakon, which 
crystallises this double-bind by its simultaneous double meaning of ‘cure’ and ‘poison’.  
This is useful for Laurent’s psychoanalytic rather than philosophical purposes, in that it 
highlights the slippage between licit and illicit drugs which often boils down to quantitative, 
rather than qualitative, criteria, thereby introducing the psychoanalytic problematic of 
repetition. This is something which everyday language already spells out for us by referring to 
addictions as ‘habits’. In the form of routines, habits are of course an essential aspect of our 
daily lives, yet they can become ‘bad habits’ by dint of an excess that reveals itself through 
repetition. Many addictions today revolve around precisely prescription drugs, demonstrating 
that what is problematic in a drug ‘habit’ is not necessarily what you are taking but how much 
and how often (and the extent to which you depart from the Other’s prescriptions of course).6 
Laurent’s point is that this pharmakonic ambiguity around repetition is structurally present 
within all medication. This is perfectly observable in the fact that, legally, you can only buy a 
certain number of paracetamol over the counter at any one time. Is this not an acknowledgement 
that the cure for a headache can become a cure for the sickness of life? Again, the word 
‘overdose’ includes this quantitative sliding beyond the intended ‘dose’. Freud already posited 
the link between repetition and the death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, and Lacan 
often reminds us of the role of repetition in the insistence of symptoms. So, although ‘doctor’s 
orders’ might prescribe a certain use of medication (two tablets twice daily etc.), the subject 
can always take advantage of medication’s relation to repetition to push towards self-
mortifying practices and perhaps even suicidal passages to the act. 
It is at this point that Laurent introduces one of his strongest theses. He argues that there is 
something in the bio-chemical effects of drugs that can plug into the trans-biological repetition 
of the symbolic unconscious. In other words, as the symptomatic signifier repeats in a symbolic 
treatment of the real (think of Freud’s grandson and his fort/da game), so drugs can function as 
a real regulation of bodily jouissance through an administration of ‘uppers’ and ‘downers’. 
Medication, that is, can come into the place of the symbolic unconscious where it may be in 
some way inoperative. Whilst this seems to imply psychotic structure, it is nonetheless a thesis 
about the psychoanalytic body more generally, the one that is by hosting parasitical signifiers 
(rather than evolutionary instincts or environmental adaptations or genetic predispositions). For 
Laurent, then, medication is introduced into the body not because of a direct conjunction 
between neuroleptic drugs and neurochemical receptors in the brain – as the pharmaceutical 
industry claims – but because the body of the speaking being is built around a hole that cannot 
always be structured as a lack. Especially in the later Lacan of the Borromean period, the body 
is a topological surface twisted into something apparently continuous only because it organises 
itself around the real of this hole: we attempt to make ourselves whole by doing something 
with this hole. In fact, this was already implied by Lacan’s early mirror stage argument, which 
demonstrated that the body is a disorganised bundle of drives until it receives an imaginary 
coherence via the Other, but also that this coherence comes at the price of an alienation from 
biological life. As imago, the ego misperceives the subject as if it were the organism. Again, 
though, everyday language speaks of a different truth: the link between the body and the 
signifier is betrayed by the fact that we tend not to say that we are a body, but that we have one 
(thereby implying the possibility of loss in the very assertion of possession).  
2) The Placebo 
To illustrate this subjective rather than biological relation between medication and the body, 
Laurent turns to the well-documented ‘placebo effect’. Like the proverbial spanner in the 
works, this effect appears in the very context designed to demonstrate medication’s most 
objective properties: namely, in the Randomised Control Trial (RCT). The RCT remains the 
‘gold standard’ within pharmaceutical research, despite several trenchant critiques of its flaws 
(see Maloney, 2013). In its simplest form, the RCT involves at least two groups: one is given 
the experimental drug being trialled, and another – the “control” group – is given a sugar-pill 
or “placebo”, i.e., something with the same appearance as the new drug, but psychoactively 
inert. It is crucial that participants in RCTs do not know to which of the two groups they have 
been assigned, or even of the existence of separate groups, since the idea is that psychological 
biases are thereby excluded. In this sense, RCTs attempt to bracket out the untrustworthy mind 
so that the brain and the body can give direct, indexical proof of a biological reality, effectively 
bringing the participants closer to the lab-rats with which pharmacology is arguably more used 
to dealing. Very awkwardly for positivist medical science, however, it is exactly at this point 
that the ‘placebo effect’ makes itself felt: it turns out that the body can respond to these inert 
sugar-pills every bit as if they had dynamic, healing, even transformative effects. Particularly 
within pain research, it has been shown that the placebo effect displays comparable and 
sometimes even better clinical efficacy than often very expensive new drugs designed to 
directly target pain receptors in the brain (Lidstone and Stoessl, 2007). Because of the expense 
of the research that precedes drug trials, pharmaceutical companies have more than once been 
tempted into suppressing these inconvenient results.8 
In thinking psychoanalytically about this phenomenon, Laurent borrows from the work of 
another French philosopher, François Dagognet (a student of Georges Canguilhem, Dagognet 
wrote a great deal on the philosophy of medicine and indeed the body). In a 1964 book entitled 
La raison et ses remèdes, Dagognet stressed the subtractive logic of RCTs whereby both the 
participant’s perceptions and the random effects of the sugar-pill are supposedly removed in 
order to isolate the tested drug’s actual effects. As Laurent puts it apropos of Dagognet, RCTs 
are based on the idea that ‘one makes use of the false to obtain the true’ (Laurent 2016, pp. 5–
6): participants are duped with a ‘semblant’ (a fake sugar-pill) to trick them into revealing a 
biochemical ‘fact’ (the empirical effects of the drug). Laurent argues that this operation of 
obtaining the true via the false in fact works, but in a totally unintended and inverse way, 
because it foregrounds a subjective truth instead of the intended objective one. 
Psychoanalytically, we could say that the ‘placebo effect’ shows that medication, even under 
allegedly controlled conditions, is invariably coloured by a remainder of transferential effects: 
desire, hope, anticipation, resentment, competitiveness, a wish to please or indeed to confound, 
can all be tied up in the exchange of pills between a subject and the medical Other.  
It is important to follow this argument all the way so that the usual binary distinction between 
truth and falsity does not re-impose itself. For it is not that the ‘placebo effect’ is the product 
of a misperception of reality, a kind of false consciousness or cognitive bias. On the contrary, 
at the very physiological level on which the medical gaze likes to focus, it is a falsity with 
demonstrably true effects (not a bad formulation for the subject supposed to know in analysis 
of course)! MRI scans and blood tests indicate that participants given placebos in RCTs do not 
perceive themselves to be in less pain: their brains and bodies actually do experience less pain. 
If this seems mysterious to positivist science, for us, as analysts, it is much less so. In it we can 
recognise the same magical torsion between psyche and soma Freud discovered with his 
hysteric patients at the end of the 19th century. The placebo effect is perfectly in keeping with 
Freud’s important term, “psychic reality”, which included the body in a new way at the same 
time as constituting a challenge to the prevailing epistemology of truth and falsity when it 
comes to human beings – hence the importance, for example, of ‘constructions in analysis’ 
which have truth-effects despite not being ‘true’ in the naïve and supposedly objective sense 
(Freud, 1937/1964). 
3) The Surplus of Life 
Under this third heading, Laurent comments on that dimension of medication by means of 
which, as he puts it, ‘the organism attempts to regain its share of living’ (p. 6). This echoes 
Lacan’s thesis in later texts, such as ‘Radiophonie’ (1970/2001b), that the body of the speaking 
being is essentially dead or inert and must borrow prosthetic supports from the Other to become 
animated.9 This may sound far-fetched, but to test this notion, one could risk separating today’s 
typical Western teenager from their most cherished prostheses – the mobile phone or the X-
Box – and the reaction would probably suggest that a part of their body had indeed been 
amputated. Not coincidentally, both of these devices plug people into a mediated 24/7 social 
life (hence the acronym FOMO, ‘Fear Of Missing Out’, which captures the contemporary dread 
of being unplugged from the now-networked social link). Rather like Frankenstein’s monster, 
then, life is bequeathed neither by a divine spark nor by evolution, but comes to the body 
increasingly from the Other of science and technology. Among these invented prostheses are 
medicines/drugs which can also be used to jump-start the feeling of life, precisely because it is 
not present in the body automatically.  
Here, Laurent offers the example of hormone supplements as one means of regulating the 
libidinal vicissitudes of existence. Since his article was published in fact, Hormone 
Replacement Therapy (HRT) has increasingly been used to treat not just the symptoms of 
menopause but also ‘disorders’ in the field of gender and sexuality. The artificial introduction 
of testosterone or oestrogen into bodies that can, as a result, move across body-based gender 
binaries, obviously has major implications for the experience of sexual difference today. 
Previously much more strictly organised by an Oedipal (and patriarchal) culture, sexual 
difference has now, thanks in part to psychoanalysis itself, become what in fact it always was: 
a pressing question to which subjects must invent their own answers by taking bits and pieces 
from the common discourse – such as the signifiers of ‘LGBTQ+’, ‘Bi’, ‘Polyamourous’, 
‘Incel’10 etc. – but also by using corresponding medical prostheses. For many in the ‘trans 
community’, HRT holds out the promise that gendered life can be not merely chemically 
regulated, but totally reinvented around a right to individual choice. For example, in response 
to the complaint said to be behind the psychiatric disorder of gender dysphoria – ‘I just feel 
wrong in this body’, or the more biological version ‘I was born into the wrong body’ – HRT is 
the first means of trying to right this wrong, sometimes, controversially, in the form of ‘puberty 
blockers’ in pre-adolescents, followed in some instances by surgical intervention. That several 
clinical cases attest to the persistence of difficulties around sexual ‘identity’ post-op is no 
surprise from a Lacanian perspective, since sex does not make an identity for anyone: on the 
contrary, as Lacan (1967/2008b) said, ‘sexuality makes a hole in truth’ (p. 21). Nor can 
identification with a gender position that is, moreover, still so wedded to anatomy that surgical 
‘re-alignment’ becomes the solution, hope to address the more structural issue of sexuation, 
which has to do with the subject’s relation to jouissance and the signifier. As numerous 
publications by people like Catherine Millot (1990), Geneviève Morel (2011) and Patricia 
Gherovici (2010, 2017) show, analytic work with such patients must tread a very careful line 
between competing discourses of the body, as well as the danger of dogmatisms internal to 
psychoanalysis (i.e., the problematic assumption that transgender subjects are inevitably 
psychotic, an assumption which seems to rest on the very Oedipal, neurotic ‘norm’ which 
psychoanalysis has always questioned, beginning with Freud himself).  
The latter half of the 20th century also saw medication intervening massively into the biological 
issue par excellence: sexual reproduction itself. For example, in a rich and suggestive phrase 
Laurent (2016) refers to the appearance of a mass-produced contraceptive pill in the 1960s as 
a ‘spectral analyser of the desire for a child’ (p. 6). The image is of Newton’s prism separating 
out the different bandwidths of white light into its constituent parts. Analogously, the pill 
separated sex from reproduction for women, turning sex into a lifestyle choice and a form of 
freedom of expression so that anatomy could become much less of a destiny. But if the pill was 
a precondition for sexual liberation, it also concentrated, like a lens focussing light, the distinct 
desire for a child: choosing to have children became something to be weighed up against other 
possible destinies for women, such as a career.  
One could also mention more recent advances in fertility treatments here, thanks to which it is 
now possible to procreate without having sex at all (secularising the ‘miracle’ of immaculate 
conception to the point of making it banal). Just as sex became an expression of a lifestyle 
choice with the pill then, so did reproduction thanks to in vitro fertilisation and more recently 
in utero genetic screening. If the pill separated sex from procreation and asked novel questions 
of the desire for a child, then reproductive technologies separated what was once ‘God’s will’ 
from the newly sanctified agency of individual choice. Such changes inevitably raise new 
moral questions, from so-called ‘designer babies’ to same-sex reconfigurations of the 
traditional family unit, and even an unmooring of the certainty of maternity (as compared to 
the traditionally more questionable issue of paternity) thanks to surrogacy.11  
Obviously, Laurent is not condemning these developments from some conservative position 
that would defend either traditional ‘family values’, ‘heterosexuality’ or even an idea of 
‘nature’ (though, regrettably, some Lacanians seemed to make such arguments around the 
mariage pour tous debate in France). Rather, he is simply identifying the diverse effects of 
medication as potentially analytic in the full etymological sense of that word: breaking things 
down into constituent parts, into their ‘bandwidths’ as it were, in itself poses new questions. 
To take another example Laurent does not broach but which seems extremely pertinent to this 
discussion, we could consider the development of Viagra. Historical anthropology 
demonstrates that the erect male member in the form of the phallus has long served as an 
emblem of symbolic power and fertility, from ancient Rome to contemporary Bhutan. So what 
does Viagra do to that almost universal use of the symbolic phallus? This is a question worth 
asking, given the frequency of symptoms of male impotence in Freud’s clinic as well as Lacan’s 
development of the phallus as a signifier (Lacan 1958/2006b) which can be approached as 
symbolic, imaginary and real. Viagra produces a chemically induced erection with a kind of 
comically Sadean permanence worthy of the Greek god Priapus. In this way, it does address 
biological impotence, but to what end? In the Freudian clinic, impotence was an opportunity 
for the neurotic to explore the difficulty of desire thanks to the mechanism of repression, but 
how could this even become a question if a tablet or two ‘resolves’ the issue but only by 
meeting a demand? Is there not something rather pathetic about this dumbly functional object 
– the real Viagra-phallus, we could say – which becomes almost as prosthetic as a dildo, even 
though it remains to all intents and purposes the same male organ? Part of the commercial 
success of Viagra has to do with its appeal to older men, of course, as if the human right to sex 
is equivalent to the right to life itself, even as life is extended further and further with the help 
of innumerable other drugs, such that a kind of zombiefied living-dead eternity beckons.12 So 
perhaps we could understand Viagra as another spectral analyser, but this time one that 
separates sex from desire, moving sex over into the very neoliberal sphere of ‘performance’? 
The openly managerial language of ‘sexual performance’ (implying an analogy with sporting 
performance too) seems to signal a very serious impotence at the level of desire, but one that 
is masked by the ability to meet superegoic demands.13 One senses the logic of the pharmakon 
here again: the remedy, ostensibly for the medical complaint of ‘erectile dysfunction’ (although 
in reality Viagra has a more recreational than medical status), becomes a kind of poison for 
phallic desire. What sustains the sexual encounter is less desire structured by fantasy, and more 
the surplus of life produced by the popping of little blue pills. 
4) Anaesthetics 
We have arrived at Laurent’s final term, anaesthetics. This evokes for me the aforementioned 
book Prozac Nation, which details the author Elizabeth Wurtzel’s struggles with depression, 
but also the growing prevalence since the 1990s of anti-depressants such as fluoxetine (Prozac 
being just one brand name among others) as the one-size-fits-all means of treatment. Wurtzel’s 
initial title for her memoir was the rather self-indulgent I Hate Myself and I Want To Die. She 
was wisely persuaded by her editor to change the title, and a probable factor in this was the 
publication, the year before her book appeared, of Listening to Prozac (1993) by the 
psychiatrist Peter D. Kramer. Kramer rightly recognised both a transformation of the very 
notion of the ‘self’ implied by Prozac which moved it inexorably towards self-improvement, 
and a corresponding shift in the role of the GP or psychiatrist: from relieving pathological 
suffering, their role became that of helping their patients become better versions of themselves. 
Kramer was responsible for coining the term ‘cosmetic psychopharmacology’, by deliberate 
analogy with cosmetic surgery where the slippage between medical necessity and narcissism 
had already been noted. But the true literary precursor of what Laurent means by anaesthetics 
is probably the ‘cosmetic’ drug par excellence, ‘soma’, in Aldous Huxley’s futuristic dystopia, 
Brave New World. There, soma is supplied by the government of the World State to eliminate 
all pain and unhappiness and thus serve as a scientific rather than a religious version of Karl 
Marx’s ‘opiate of the masses’. However, one of the characters, Linda, becomes so addicted to 
her ‘soma holidays’ that she overdoses, while the main protagonist, John, commits suicide 
rather than succumb to the soporific effects of these supposedly happy pills. Relatedly, then, 
Laurent’s use of the term ‘anaesthesia’ speaks to a soma-like numbing or muffling of the pain 
of life which does indeed appeal to today’s neoliberal governments, concerned as they are to 
medicate the discontents of the ‘brave new worlds’ over which they preside.  
Laurent is interested in the fact that this particular signifier testifies to a cross-over from surgery 
on the one hand (anaesthetics for conducting operations, and for managing pain post-
operatively as an analgesic), into a generalised self-medication on the other (becoming one’s 
own permanent anaesthetist, as it were). For example, one of the most prescribed psychiatric 
drugs, chlorpromazine, was a surgical anaesthetic long before it became an anti-psychotic, and 
it continues to be used today to control not only moods, but also nausea and vomiting. In so far 
as ‘anaesthesia’ captures something of Big A.’s use of marijuana to treat his ‘agitated’ body 
mentioned above, it is worth noting that marijuana, too, is frequently at the juncture between 
medication and home-based recreation, as recent discussions about its value for sufferers of 
MS suggests. This movement of anaesthesia from hospital settings into homes and back again 
has obvious connections to the UK’s own push for ‘Care in the Community’ under Margaret 
Thatcher, which would have been unthinkable without the role of self-administered anti-
psychotics and anti-depressants. As anyone who has ever been involved in discharges from a 
psychiatric unit will know, the key criterion for returning home is compliance with the right 
regime of ‘meds’ (the job of Community Psychiatric Nurses being largely to check up on the 
maintenance of this compliance at home). But thanks to the extremely widespread prescription 
of anti-depressants to the ‘worried well’, who may never have any dealings with psychiatric 
services at all, anaesthesia is the form of medication we are most likely to come across in the 
lives of our analysands. To the very same complaints analysands initially bring to analysis, GPs 
will often respond, as Kramer foresaw, not by listening, but by writing out a prescription (and 
it is not always clear whose anxiety is being treated in this kind of transaction, patient or 
doctor). 
However, Laurent points out that Lacan, addressing a room full of doctors at Sainte-Anne 
Hospital on 10th November 1967, reminded them that even if patients arrive asking for such 
pills, there is an ineradicable subjective component in this demand to which the doctor has an 
opportunity – indeed an obligation – to respond ethically (as opposed to Dr. Shaw in Brave 
New World, who grants Linda the dosage of soma she asks for despite knowing it will kill her, 
seemingly because he implicitly agrees with her death wish). In the prevalent request for happy 
pills today, one can still hear a subject’s desire, especially if one does not immediately meet 
that request on its own terms by writing out a prescription. This is good advice to analysts too, 
some of whom work in institutional contexts where anaesthesia may be a common recourse, 
but who, precisely as analysts, must frustrate such demands in order that unconscious desire 
might emerge (and this is not, to repeat, the same as a blanket rejection of the option of 
medication but a nuanced use of it). 
From the point of view of the differential clinic then, it is important to wonder about what kind 
of request for medication is being made by a subject, whether to a GP or a psychiatrist or 
‘across the counter’. Is it a neurotic demand addressed to the Other to force a proof of love 
from them, the drug itself being primarily an object of exchange in the dialectic of desire? Or, 
is it more of a psychotic strategy for keeping the invasive Other at bay with an object that 
regulates jouissance and sometimes excuses one from the Symbolic order (as in Big A.’s use 
of marijuana)? Could it also be a way of making a fragmented schizophrenic body cohere by 
giving real support to its imaginary contours (as in Big A.’s recourse to steroids to give his 
body the ‘armour’ it had lost)? Might it also provide a signifying support for a delusional 
metaphor, in which conspiracy theories about individual GPs or indeed ‘Big Pharma’ can 
localise a persecutory Other in relation to which the paranoid subject can find a viable position? 
Could it even be a perverse ruse to provoke anxiety in the medical Other by hinting at the 
pharmakon-ic ambiguity of a drug (you have to give it to me, but just so you know, I may kill 
myself with it …)? 
Concluding Thoughts 
In summary, then, Laurent’s article enjoins us to be aware that there is a subject present in all 
four forms of medication – the pharmakon, the placebo, the surplus of life and anaesthetics – 
not merely a customer with a biological body defined by ‘health’. Science may make these 
medical objects for consumption via the market exactly on the model of the discourse of the 
capitalist which Lacan formalised in 1971,14 but it is always subjects that make use of them in 
particular ways, and that introduce them into a structure of discourse, including analytic 
discourse.  
This is a crucial point because the discourse of the capitalist, which most closely resembles that 
of the master, reduces the subject to a consumer who seems to enjoy the objects of the market, 
but is in fact enjoyed by them, without limit or respite. Lacan captures the tendency of the 
capitalist discourse to produce something like burnout with a pun: ‘ça se consomme si bien que 
ça se consume’, meaning capitalism ‘consumes so well it consumes itself/burns itself’ (Lacan 
1972). The consumer of drugs is always in danger of being consumed by them because he or 
she is being enjoyed by the Other of the market. As Lacan makes clear, however, the discourse 
of the analyst is distinct from that of the capitalist, enabling the extraction of a subject from 
this consumer consumed by consumption. My analysand, Big A., did so under transference via 
the anaesthetic logic behind steroids: he moved them out of the explicitly medical realm (in 
which they are used to dampen over-active immune responses or reduce inflammation, but also 
as commodities in increasingly monetised exchanges) into the home he shared with his son, 
where the repetitive habit of injecting them supplemented his other attempts to knot the real 
and the imaginary registers. What Big A.’s case shows, I hope, is that while we as analysts 
must not work for ‘Big Pharma’, we can work with what it offers to our analysands by way of 
opportunities for invention.  
Endnotes 
1. For example, when he admitted that ‘[a] layman will no doubt find it hard to understand how pathological 
disorders of the body and mind can be eliminated by “mere” words. He will feel that he is being asked to believe 
in magic’ (Freud 1905/1953, p. 282). Compare this to the more confident assertion that ‘[w]ords and magic were 
in the beginning one and the same thing and even today they retain much of their magical power’ (Freud 
1916/1963, p. 16).  
2. The third iteration of the DSM (1980), which introduced this central notion of neurochemical ‘imbalances’, 
both explicitly purged the remnants of Freudian psychopathological categories and, not by coincidence, almost 
doubled the number of disorders to 265.  
3. The most egregious example of this is probably the removal of the so-called ‘bereavement exclusion’ from 
the DSM-5’s criteria for depression, making it possible to medicalise grief by diagnosing pathological 
depression just two weeks after the death of, say, a husband or a child. In the absence of the differential 
diagnosis indicated in Freud’s 1914 paper ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, arbitrary ‘norms’ of behaviour 
pathologise more and more areas of life, including death and our responses to it. Nor should it be forgotten that 
these are culturally specific norms that ride roughshod over numerous other cultures which have their own 
frameworks for expressing grief. See also Leader, 2009.  
4. For a powerful documentary on this issue, see Fire in the Blood: Medicine, Monopoly, Malice (dir. Dylan 
Mohan Gray, 2018). For a Freudian discussion of the implications in the American context, which echoes many 
of the points I make here, see Jamieson Webster’s piece in The New York Review of Books, ‘The 
Psychopharmacology of Everyday Life’, which can be accessed here: 
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/11/19/the-psychopharmacology-of-everyday-life/. 
5. He is emphatic on this in the ‘Proposition du 9th october 1967 sur le psychanalyste de l’École’’: “there is no 
possible definition of the therapeutic, other than that it is the restoration of an initial state – a definition that it is 
precisely impossible to give in psychoanalysis” (Lacan, 1967/2001a, p. 246, my translation). 
6. As this is merely a vignette, I cannot go into detail about how I arrived at this diagnosis or its function in 
directing the treatment with Big A. However, I do want to highlight some general differences between the 
Lacanian approach to diagnosis and the broadly ‘psychiatric’ one, which this term ‘schizophrenia’ threatens to 
obscure. The term was invented by the Swiss psychiatrist, Eugen Bleuler, who was an early champion of the 
relevance of Freudian psychopathology for what Kraepelin before him had called ‘dementia praecox’ (despite 
Freud himself having reservations about this extension of his technique to the psychoses). Lacan, who was a 
psychiatrist before he was a psychoanalyst, also used the term ‘schizophrenia’ in his differential diagnosis of the 
psychoses, but with a crucial epistemological difference. Whereas classical psychiatry tended to be driven by a 
taxonomic project which, by analogy with the natural sciences, hoped to enumerate all the ‘species’ of mental 
illness as if they were objective organic entities, Lacan was consistently critical of any ontological approach to 
diagnosis which fits patients into pre-existing categories. From a Lacanian point of view, a diagnosis offers a 
clinical compass for the treatment, but does not imply a labelling of a subject’s being, which is always singular. 
This de-ontologising move in Lacan is already present in his recourse to structuralism, but it becomes even more 
pronounced in his later work when he uncouples neurosis from any reference to a norm. Thus, in ‘diagnosing’ 
Big A. as a schizophrenic, I merely highlight the predominance, in my clinical encounter with him, of bodily 
phenomena which did not respond to any treatment via the signifier. 
7. For a discussion of addiction and subjectivity, see Wright, 2015. 
8. In 2014 in the UK, a Public Accounts Committee Report, entitled ‘Access to Clinical Trial Information and 
the Stockpiling of Tamiflu’, found that RCTs which gave a favourable verdict of a new drug were about twice as 
likely to be published as non-favourable ones. 
9. I am thinking of Lacan’s answer to the second question posed to him by Robert Georgin, which invited him to 
link psychoanalysis, linguistics and ethnology. Lacan suggests that ‘the being sustained by [the body] does not 
know that language is what discerns it for him, to the point that it would not be, without being able to speak’ and 
then, somewhat enigmatically, ‘[t]he first body makes the second by incorporating itself’ (Lacan, 1970/2001b, p. 
409, my translation). I take the first body here to be the body of the Other of language, and the second to be 
what we can only experience as ‘our’ body if language, even as lalangue, has marked it in some way.  
10. ‘Incel’ is a relatively recent acronym that stands for ‘involuntarily celibate’ and is associated with a 
virulently reactionary and anti-feminist discourse espoused mostly online by young men angry that women will 
not sleep with them. As repellent as it is, it can still be recognised as one contemporary manifestation of a 
response to the sexual non-rapport.  
11. For a sustained discussion of these shifts in the nature of motherhood and the family, see The Lacanian 
Review: Hurly Burly – Family Dramas, Family Traumas, No. 4, Winter 2018. 
12. This sounds extreme, and yet the rising appeal of an immortal ‘bare’ life for its own sake is evident. During 
the last American presidential election, one Zoltan Istvan founded the Transhumanist Party and spread its key 
policy idea – eradicating death – by travelling around the country in an ‘Immortality Bus’ shaped like a coffin! 
Beyond this stunt, cryogenics is a genuinely growing business in the US.  
13. In this sense, the title of the 2011 film, directed by Neil Burger, which raises the issue of nootropic drugs (or 
cognitive performance enhancing ‘smart drugs’) in the corporate sphere, is perfect: Limitless.  
14. See his ‘Du discours psychanalytique’ (1972) which is available at: http://espace.freud.pagespro-
orange.fr/topos/psycha/psysem/italie.htm. 
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